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Executive Summary  
 
Russia is in a rather difficult situation concerning the freedom of worship. 
Foreign experts put it in the list of countries with "the discriminating legislation or 
preconceived policy which causes detriment to certain religions, though the 
government's activities are in accordance with the Constitution"
1
. 
Thus, it is necessary to elaborate recommendations for the authorities to 
conduct state social policy not contradicting the Constitutions, international rights 
and freedoms, and for members of the Russian Orthodox Church, for "traditional" 
and "non-traditional" confessions acting in Russia to overcome negative results of 
national and religious intolerance. 
For the Executive and Legislative Authorities of the Russian 
Federation: 
1. First of all, it is necessary to prove the unity of the state by curbing the 
religious (orthodox) fundamentalism through the key spheres – religious 
tolerance and social values. 
2. The analysis of the legislation shows a serious disparity between it and the 
real situation at the religious sphere. So, it needs to change the existing 
norms provoking the discrimination between confessions or on the basis 
of their "traditionalism – non-traditionalism". 
3. All around Russia in every social institute (family, educational 
establishment and so on) to declare secular values, based on the principles 
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of freedom and equality. It concerns especially the institutes of 
socializations and interiorisation of the rising generation. We need to stop 
the joining of the state and the church, and the church with school, 
because religious world viewing with its mystique and myths is not 
combined with the scientific knowledge.  
4. The purpose of such education is to acquaint people with religions of 
Russia and neighboring states to help them to realize that all people have 
an equal right to believe in the verity of their religion, and that other 
people, different by their confessions, are actually just the same human 
beings. 
For the Russian Orthodox Church (the ROC): 
1. In Russia the Orthodox fundamentalism is the most dangerous. It takes 
the political forms of archaic and extreme content and can change the 
whole political culture, therefore, the ideology of the state social policy.  
2. As far as the ROC is the most influent power in today's Russian social 
and political situation, it is very important whether it will be able to 
overcome its own ambitions and to put a line between the Church and 
Fundamentalism, not falling into the "political sectarianism".  
3. The ROC must declare in public open attitude of the Church to the 
modern society, free from any chauvinistic reminiscent.  
For all other confessions acting in Russia: 
1. As long as many confessions have rather wide judicial practice (due to 
often trials) including international experience (by foreign missioners) it 
is necessary to participate in development of the legislative initiatives 
directed to bringing the Russian legislation to the highest European and 
world standards in the sphere of freedom of worship and to monitor 
regularly law drafts and international pacts of Russia. 
 
Key Problems in the Sphere of Government – Public – Religious 
Communities Relationships in Russia 
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The General Framework  
During the past 15-20 years an interest to religion significantly arose in 
Russia. Some researchers are discussing so called "Russian idea" that is connected, 
in their view, with a deep need of Russian soul in some kind of transcendental and 
sacral sense of existence. That is why we can encounter now an opinion that some 
degree of religious fundamentalism is intrinsic for psychology and conscience of 
Russian people.   
However, this interest to ecclesiastical issues is accompanied mainly by the 
formal religiosity of people. We can presuppose that this ambivalence is a result of 
profound crisis that is being undergone by Russian society and affecting all the 
spheres of social life, including the field of religious relations.   
Since the 90
th
 of the last century the new social framework is being created 
in Russia. This new political system was supposed to guarantee all universal 
human rights, including the right of worship. The Constitution of the Russian 
Federation affirms that "no one ideology can be introduced as an official or 
obligatory one" (Item 13, 1993); "Russian Federation – is a secular society. No one 
religion can be established as an official or obligatory one" (Item 14). As a matter 
of fact this document provided legislative background for further proliferation of 
democratic principles of liberty and equality. Probably the first time in 1000 years 
of Russian history democracy eventually had got a chance to replace either 
confessional absolutism or atheistic totalitarianism.  
Today, after twenty years of liberal reforms one can observe the paradoxical 
things in Russia: the vast majority of population is deprived of all country's 
resources, bureaucratic capitalism is developed here in its worst form, many 
democratic institutions (like election of governors in regions)  are abolished, and, 
finally, political elite hand in hand with the Orthodox clergy are doing their best to 
turn the Russian Orthodox religion into a kind of official Russian ideology, thus 
finishing the remains of democratic practices, ideas, and hopes off. Of course, it is 
not legal (yet), it is contradictory with the Constitution (yet), and with the common 
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sense (yet), and it is being discussed to a degree in academic circles
2
. Nevertheless 
this tendency proved to be steady and highly purposeful, while everything that is 
being considered as obstacles to its "sustainable development" is blamed publicly, 
and discriminated juristically and spiritually.  
The Legislative Issues  
It is paradoxical, but the former "Law on Freedom of Religion", which was 
enacted yet in the USSR in 1990 was much more democratic and liberal in 
comparison with the acting Russian "Law on Freedom of Religion and Religious 
Organizations" (1997). That soviet Law provided the citizens with vast rights to 
chose religion and to worship.
3
 The ecclesiastical field, or if we put it in the 
Orthodox terms, "ecumenical territory" had been quickly filled in with various 
religious organizations, thus challenging the traditional spiritual monopoly of the 
Russian Orthodox Church. It is natural enough, that the latter started to defend its 
"territory", employing for this purpose among other things its strong ties with the 
authorities, both local and federal, and media.
4
 
In terms of democratic practice some statements of the acting Law sound 
rather questionably. The most obvious contradictions are as follows:  
- in the Law's preamble "the very special role of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in the history of Russia, and in development of her spirituality and culture" 
is acknowledged, at the same time the same Law prohibits "any propaganda of 
religious superiority" (Item 3, 1997);  
- the possibility to register or re-register religious organization is severely 
limited by the "fifteen years" rule, according to which a religious organization can 
be officially registered only after it is able to document its existence in Russia for 
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not less then fifteen years (Item 11, 1999 following a review of the 1997 Law by 
the Constitutional Court).  
The "fifteen years" rule embarrassed representatives of new religious 
movements in Russia
5
. They lodged a lot of complaints to the Constitutional Court 
of the Russian Federation, where pointed at the discrepancies between some of the 
items of the Law in question and the Constitution of Russia, what restrict in fact 
the freedom of conscience and the right of worship.  
Thus, in expert view this Law enacted in autumn 1997, breached 16 items of 
the Constitution of RF, and at least three international treaties signed by Russia, 
concerning mainly human rights and liberties
6
. 
Another contradiction is, so to say, of terminological descent. What do they 
mean by sentence "propaganda of religious superiority"? How can we discern 
"propaganda" from what is one of the main purposes of any religion – missionary 
activity?  Do they mean inadmissibility of proliferation of religious ideas among 
the adherents of other confessions? But according to the same Law, religious group 
is an association of citizens, consolidated in purpose of "joint worship and 
proliferation of their belief" (Items 7-8). Where are the precise distinctions 
between "propaganda" (proselytism) and "proliferation"?   
New Law put an end to long confrontation between so called "traditional" 
and "nontraditional" religions in Russia. The latter lost. According to this Law, the 
Russian citizens wishing to organize religious association, in case they are 
adherents of traditional religion, acquire the rights to possess property of any kind 
(Item 21), besides of tax exemption their organization may apply for financial 
donations from the Federal Government (Item 4), may ask to proclaim their 
religious holydays to be the days off (Item 4), may ask for postponement of army 
service for their clergy (Item 3), may establish educational organizations (Item 5). 
Nothing of this sort is allowed to religious groups which are not able to document 
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their existence in Russia for not less then fifteen years, i.e. – to "nontraditional" 
religions.  
All amendments that were made to the Law in question till the middle of 
2004 were substantiated in very simple way: there is a necessity "to protect 
Russian society from various extremist religious organizations and missioners", "to 
protect Russian citizens from totalitarian sects and destructive cults". Thus, 
majority of the "new religious movements" were assailed even without any serious 
analysis of their dogmas and activity.  
 
 
The Troubles and Concerns 
The so called "anti-sect" seminars are conducted under the auspices of the 
Orthodox Church annually in each region of Russia, for many non-Orthodox 
confessions and denominations to be at the endless suits on prohibition of 
registration or re-registration is already a common practice, the buildings of civil 
purpose (kinder gardens, libraries, planetaria, etc) are being returned to the so 
called "legal owners" – the Orthodox communities.  
Archbishop of Irkutsk - Vadim in his recent public speech expressed 
negative view towards the "proselytizing activity" of the Roman Catholic Church 
in Russia in general, and in Siberia in particular. Archbishop appealed to the fact 
that in its time there was concluded an agreement between Vatican and Byzantium, 
according to which an "ecumenical territory" was divided, and since those times no 
one Church had right to break this "treaty", i.e. to cross the line. All the pathos of 
this sentence was about the fact, that, in a view of archbishop, the Roman Catholics 
recently treacherously breached this bilateral agreement, building now the Catholic 
temples in Siberia, and revitalizing the Catholic communities here.  For me it 
sounds like a talk about a convention on zones of influences, on which some mobs 
agreed, rather then the candid concern about problem of ecclesiastical 
relationships, or a search for eternal truth and blessing.   
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According to the data of the Slavic Centre for Law and Justice
7
, only during 
the first four months of 2005 the number of various persecutions, oppressions, 
breaching of believers' rights reached the number of the same incidents committed 
during two previous years (2003, 2004) together. Incidents that include attempts to 
confiscate buildings (churches and temples), arsons and blowing up of worship 
places, assailments and insulting of representatives of different Protestant 
organizations and their clergymen from the side of as fanatic groups, as policemen 
took place in 2005 in cities: Moscow, Tula, Yekaterinburg, Chelyabinsk, Podolsk, 
Tyumen, Krasnodar, Izhevsk, and Balashikha. As a rule, the suits on such events 
do not have any serious effect. Thus, in these circumstances we can talk about 
purposeful and steady persecution of "nontraditional" churches in Russia.  
The "Conception of the National Religious Policy of the Russian 
Federation"
8
 says that the State considers as threats to national security, social 
stability and human rights some tendencies and processes of destructive character, 
and as the main generators and sources of these is named the "negative influence of 
some foreign religious organizations and missioners, cultural-religious expansion 
from the territory of neighboring countries, and religious extremism inside Russia".  
Another interesting note: the more law-abiding the believers – 
representatives of the "non-traditional confessions" are, the stronger the pressure 
upon them is – both from the part of the authorities and the clerics, who disparages 
their dogma and cult practice by the press and conducts judicial inquiry of their 
"unlawful activity". The list of such disinformation is rather large: beginning with 
the accusations in confrontation with the state authorities, family destruction, 
disorientation of young people and ending with encouraging interconfessional 
hostility and violation of common morals. 
An excellent example is hostile attitude of the authorities and orthodox 
eparchy to Jehovah's Witnesses, despite the fact that in Russia as well as in the 
whole world the number of adherents is not more than 0.1 per cent of the Russian 
                                                 
7
 http://www.rlinfo.ru 
8
 The Conception was issued in 2004 by the Department of Religious Studies of the Russian Academy of Civil 
Service, Moscow. By the way, clergy of the Moscow Patriarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church are receiving on 
regular basis a kind of "professional training" in management  with this educational institution.  
 8 
population. Thus, in June, 1996, in Moscow it was taken legal proceedings against 
unlawful activity of Jehovah's Witnesses.
9
 The facts confirming such an activity 
were gathered by the Committee for Youth Rescue from Destructive Cults which 
was set up with the help of The Russian Orthodox Church in the middle 90s of the 
twentieth century. In the Committee's presentation it was stated that "the Jehovah's 
Witnesses – is a strong totalitarian world sect, which attracts the juvenile into the 
sect with mental programming, worsens hard a material position of its members' 
families with a strict system of fees; stirs up hatred against traditional religions, 
causing thus a destruction of national traditions in the youth's mind; increases the 
number of ruptures of family ties; foments religious and national discord; 
expounds the ideas of absolute superiority of some people over others; forces fear 
predicting "the doomsday".
10
 However, after long hearings in 1998 the proceeding 
was stopped due to the absence of evidences.  
Very few Russian scientists have ventured to study the teaching of 
Jehovah'sWitnesses, because the very mentioning of this confession even in the 
scientific surrounding evoked only negative response. At the same time, at the end 
of the last century Nickolay Gordienko – a well-known scholar, an honorable 
professor of the Russian State Pedagogical University, in his monograph showed 
the past and the present of the confession, gave an objective characteristic of its 
teaching and activity, its relation to duties and everyday life. The author comes to 
the conclusion that "…they (i.e. Jehovah's Witnesses) are socially passive, 
apolitical, but law-abiding citizens of their country, respectful toward their 
authorities of all levels… they have been very seldom called to account for 
economic abuses or crimes… …they are hard working, responsible to society they 
live in… They are very kind not only to like-believers but to the rest people".
11
 I 
have come to rather similar conclusions studying the character of interaction 
between Christian confessions and social institutions in today's Russia. Jehovah's 
Witnesses themselves organized repeatedly the workshops, trying to attract there 
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public circles and especially, representatives of the scientific world. However, all 
these efforts had not any success in making an image of the confession more 
attractive for the majority and even in some cases aroused new confrontations. 
New waves of protest have rolled all over the country claiming to forbid the 
activity of Jehovah's Witnesses. In Moscow it is taken a public trial against this 
confession with a demand to liquidate "The Religious Community of Jehovah's 
Witnesses in Moscow". The court found out that the Charter, regulating the activity 
of the organization, namely the Moscow Community, and its internal rules have 
serious disparity, which has caused infringement of the Federal Laws of Russia, 
the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the Family Code of the RF, the Labor 
Code, basic Russian laws on health defense, and has resulted in broken families, 
infringement minors' rights, other citizens' personal rights and freedoms. That time 
the Committee for Youth Rescue from Destructive Cults got ready thoroughly: 
there were heard testimonies of victims, carried out religiological, psychological, 
linguistic, and other expertise. Due to clauses 194-198 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure of the Russian federation the court decided to liquidate the organization 
of Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow, to forbid its activity in the city and to make 
them pay for the conducted expertise and law costs in favor of the state (total 
amount 140.400 rubles).
12
 That is the price of the struggle for the freedom of 
worship and religion. 
We may state that in today's Russia people have much less religious freedom 
than there was at the beginning of the nineties of the last century, but much more 
than they had in the seventies or eighties. At least, nobody is put in prison for 
setting up a religious organization, or studying and disseminating religious 
literature. Universities do not pay attention to religious beliefs of applicants, and an 
employer does not criticize in public his workers for their religion and does not 
make them refuse their beliefs threatening with discharge.
13
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 The same infringement of rights and freedoms is rather often in today's Turkmenistan. Public insulting, threats of 
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Nevertheless, since the middle nineties the Russian authorities create more 
and more artificial barriers for religious minorities, and these barriers are not 
always based on the valid legislation. For example, at the beginning of the 90s any 
solvent person could lease a building (it was a usual situation for religious 
organizations). At the last years non-traditional religious communities often meet 
with the administrative opposition. Officials explain a refusal of leasing, especially 
for the Protestants, saying that to conduct a divine service in a public building the 
community should have a permission to do so from an Orthodox clergy. And this 
is an obvious breach of the Constitution and the Law on Freedom of Worship and 
Religion (1997), which by the way is not as liberal as the one of the year 1990. 
There is a religious discrimination against military-men. Moscow 
Patriarchate has sign special collaboration agreements with the Ministry of 
Defense, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Education and others. For the rest 
confessions such agreements remain just a theoretical possibility.
14
 
There are also violations in such sphere of symbolic activity as participation 
of the Russian Orthodox Church in various solemn procedures for assumption of 
an office, for example, participation of the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia 
Aleksy II in president V.Putin's inauguration (1999 and 2002), participation of the 
Archbishop of Irkutsk and Angarsk Vadim in the ceremony of assumption of an 
office by the governor of the Irkutsk region A.Tishanin (September, 2005).  But 
the mostly troublesome thing is the desire of the state to interfere with religious life 
by the revival of the former Soviet body – Council on Religion. At the same time, 
to appoint a "representative" (or as it is in many regions of the RF – an advisor of 
the Governor on collaboration with religious organizations) it is necessary to have 
a mutual free will of the government (or regional authorities) and the Patriarchate.  
The results of such relations between the authorities and the church affect 
negatively the cultural policy of the state in the sphere of preservation of cultural 
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and historical monuments. Thus, in Kostroma at the end of 2004 the long 
proceeding on assignation of the historical-architectural museum "Ipatievsky 
Monastery" ' s buildings has been completed. Despite long negotiations, court 
sessions, and even hunger-strikes museum workers did not get church stuff, icons, 
and regal relics. Besides, they were told to leave the monastery in two weeks 
despite the fact there had not been granted a place (which had to be granted by the 
law) to put there not confiscated funds and unique collections. "There are a lot of 
claims against Kostroma's Eparchy as an owner of the most part of the exhibits. 
The monastery should become a place of pilgrimage as well as all famous Russian 
temples. But church ministers are going to organize excursions by themselves, and 
have already signed some agreements with tour operators for a future season".
15
  
The recent report of the Ministry of Justice (November, 2005) states a 
decision to take radical actions on control strengthening over religious 
organizations. Specifically, it is supposed to make the order of entrance vises' 
issuing stricter for missioners and the procedure of religious centers' liquidation 
simpler.
16
 
Pogroms of art exhibits, the authors of which dare to speak on the Orthodox, 
are usual in Russia, because modern art in this country is considered to be almost a 
crime. Thus, in Saint Petersburg in March, 2004 orthodox fanatics attacked the 
exposition of "Cosmopolitic icons" by Oleg Yanushevsky.  
Scientific world also becomes an object of spiritual expansion for the most 
influent confession in Russia. For example, in Novosibirsk, in the center of the 
most advanced scientific society, under the patronage of Novosibirsk Eparchy of 
the Russian Orthodox Church in November, 9-11, 2004, the International 
Conference "Totalitarian Sects and Democratic State" was conducted, where on the 
part of all advanced public (religiologists, teologists, clergy, experts on sects and 
cults, psychologists, psychiatrists, journalists, lawyers, representatives of public 
organizations, state authorities, and  informative centers on destructive cults, and 
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adherents of traditional religions – citizens of different countries, people of various 
nationalities, beliefs and religions – 603 participants in total) it was declared that 
the main threat to human rights and democratic freedoms is "totalitarian 
destructive sects and some definite states and extremist organizations supporting 
them". The list of destructive cults and sects consist of more than 400 religious 
organizations from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The result of the conference 
is multiple appeals of its participants to the President of the RF and the authorities 
of different regions of Russia concerning the impossibility of spreading the 
influence of totalitarian sects onto human life and a real threat to the state from the 
activity of the destructive cults.
17
  
The participants of another International Conference "Neo-Pentecostal Sects 
in Russia: the Threat of Religious Extremism" (232 delegates in total) appealed to 
representatives of the state and local governments "to not give any support (even 
moral) to the destructive Neo-Pentecostal sects", and to remember "about the 
state's duty to protect its citizens from any encroachments upon their personalities, 
health, property and freedom". The conference was also organized by Saratov 
Eparchy of the ROC and Saratov State University with blessing by His Holiness 
Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia Aleksy II  and with support of the 
Administrations of Saratov region and Saratov City.
18
 
However, for all fairness it should be noted that the situation with religious 
freedom is not so sad and hopeless comparing different regions of Russia, for there 
are single instances when local authorities do something for religious freedom and 
kind relations between traditional and non-traditional, large and small confessions. 
The Roots of the Problem 
The developed situation is caused by a complex of reasons including 
historical, political, sociocultural and economic ones. In the field of religious 
relations in Russia different stakeholders' interests have met – the Government, the 
Orthodox church, "traditional" religions of Russia and "non-traditional" religious 
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organizations, public organizations on human rights defending – each of them has 
its own specific aims. 
The Government of the RF now is eager to find the so called "national idea" 
for Russia. The power vertical is strengthen constantly – since the beginning of 
2005 governors are appointed by the Kremlin, regions are getting larger, political 
groups of opposition are gradually brought back to the outline of public life, 
independent press becomes more and more dependent,  and so on. However, 
"power comes from the above, but legitimacy appears from the bottom" 
(M.Weber), that is why Russian authorities looks so urgently for any ideological 
construction applicable for the society in the whole and which could have included 
all authoritative trends and doubtful reforms, making them legitimate. 
All these searches of national ideology, beginning from Yeltcin and ending 
with Putin, reflected inevitably the most urgent interest of the authorities – national 
ideology should strengthen their governmental position, the position of the 
almighty Russian state bureaucracy. 
During the transformation period it is not possible to keep for a long time 
dynamic balance among all life systems. The tension between various strata of 
society is getting stronger. Even at the level of vital practice considerable 
contradictions appear, causing conflicts and struggle, which turns into mass clashes 
of opposite interests by ethnic, religious, political, cultural and other indications 
The project of creating "megaideology of superimperia", which is discussed 
very seriously now in the scientific world, seems to be no more than an illusion. 
Such efforts "to embrace the boundless" putting together all polar and unequal in 
their strength fragments cannot bring any positive results. But one of possible 
ideological dominants is to play the most important part in upswing of the Russian 
culture and economics, and the rest ones, if favorable circumstances, are just to 
support the processes of stabilization.  
Let's explain why. Liberal-democratic ideology, formed during the last 10-
15 years as a set of spread west ideals of "financial capitalism", "freedom of human 
rights" and "freedom of worship", is in fact the idea of serving to personal interests 
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and to wishes of an individual by the principle "Everyone is for oneself, not 
violating the society's rules". However in Russia this principle of "social 
synergism", accepted scrupulously by the economically mobile sphere of 
businessmen, industry owners and politicians, is just an appendix of permanent 
social deviation – the artificial selection of the strongest ones (not for one's mind 
and virtues but for slyness and physical strength). It turns into philosophy of 
permissiveness, quasiegalitarian cover – "benefit for all wishing" with a proviso of 
"a weak section". Social minority of proprietors, grown rich in the new 
environment, turned out to be unable to establish steady social contacts and to 
acquire cultural skills, and this has reflected on people's prosperity.  
It is not surprising that for the most Russian people with their historically 
formed collective mentality, communal and emergency character of production it 
turned out to be impossible "to strike while the iron is hot all alone". New norms 
and rules showed their contradiction and isolation from the developed schemes of 
regulations and controls after people behavior. Social justice has been changed 
with social freedom, but there was not enough time to learn how to use it.  That is 
why the reforms of transformations of institutes in the western way, based on 
rational choice when norms are considered as limitations and stimulus to choice, 
failed. 
The reformation of social institutions goes from the top, i.e. it is connected 
with the activity of the authorities who are too far from people to let democratic 
society develop. Misunderstanding the traditions of western liberalism the 
authorities excuse themselves from the responsibility for those social-economic 
and social-political processes, which need considerable payments and active 
support. Monetization of benefits, transference of social payments to the regions' 
responsibility, centralized appointment of regional governors – it is only a surface 
part of the coming authoritarism in Russia. 
The main postulate of the state policy - exemption from paternal directives 
and state control of almost all life systems – caused strong social-economic 
difference among the people. While there is rather a dynamic growth of benefits of 
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some population groups, occupied mostly in the competitive spheres of economics, 
real profits of the population fall generally, despite annual growth of a minimal 
wage.  
The democracy of our "quasidemocratic" country influences badly the 
system of moral and ideological values of Russian citizens, institutes of religion, 
family and education. Policy institutes, including parties and organizations, 
manipulate skillfully public conciseness with the quasiselective system. 
If basic values are reduced, values satisfying demands of safety, social ties, 
self-respect,  and if leaders of public opinions, bearers of "cultural symbolic 
capital", are not protected from devaluation, it results not only in stagnation in 
various spheres of human life.   
Now it is necessary to say a few words on imperial-orthodox determinant, 
which seizes public opinion. Not only the ability of Russian people to adapt radical 
changes (ideological and religious-atheistic pendulum of years 1905, 1917, 1943, 
1991) is very remarkable, but it is also very interesting that in Russia the peak of 
religiousness always coincides with deep moral regress of the people. 
The Russian Orthodox Church more and more incorporates basic socially 
important institutes (of family and education), and in the nearest future it can 
become a norm forming authority and start forming ideological and moral 
orientations as it was in the Middle Ages. In thi case we may predict active 
sacralization and reduction of the role of science, culture, art, education as the 
basic translators of the values. The sign of it is a document “Bases of Social 
Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church”, passed in 2000, in which a wide range 
of collaboration between the Church and the State is drawn in the sphere of 
education and culture. Whether this “unite of God and Caesar” serve to public use 
we may judge by historical facts of such relations, beginning from the violent 
baptism at the end of the 10
th
 century, mass self-immolations of the Old-Believers, 
caused by radical church reformations, but mostly by the punitive actions of the 
tsarist power (the 17
th
 century), and ending with dramatic events of the 20
th
 
century. 
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For its long history the Church still has failed to make a tough ideological-
moral system. Besides, it has failed to instill the proper respect to the holy bible 
precepts and to the saints’ deeds into its flock, and, more important, to root these 
precepts and patterns of virtue into the life norm. The Church has failed to make its 
people know well all religious dogmas, rites and services, and moreover they 
adhere to these high moral norms in their everyday life. 
When analyze mass polls, conducted in the country to find out the citizens’ 
moral and material condition, we come to the conclusion that the majority wills the 
Soviet system come back, meaning it will bring back social justice – the state 
system of social guarantees in the sphere of security, labor, free education and 
medicine.  
Thus in August, 2003, “Regions.Ru” polled the visitors of the site on the 
theme “Orthodoxy in Russia and Abroad”. Answers to the question about the 
necessity for the Orthodox Church to have a special status in Russia demonstrate 
clearly the existence of certain serious ideological disagreements in the Russian 
society. Almost the half of the respondents (42%) holds on the modern liberal 
values: “we have a secular state, so all religions should have equal rights”. The 
number of those thinking the state must see the difference between Orthodoxy and 
other cults not relative to Russia’s history was a little larger. 29% of respondents 
thought Russia should be an Orthodox country, and the other 20% - that Orthodoxy 
might share its status only with the traditional religions. There were only 3% of 
militant atheists thinking that any religion must be restricted. 
Another question was devoted to the theme very popular in the press: “What 
is your opinion on kids’ studying “The Bases of the Orthodox Culture” in school”? 
The public divided almost in two equal parts. 49% of the respondents said they 
supported the idea. Besides, 33% of people thought, interested kids might study 
Orthodoxy in Sunday schools, and 12% stayed at the position of militant atheism, 
saying it was no good in propaganda of “cleric obscurantism”.   
The next question was about the consequences of studying this subject in 
schools. The supporters of “The Bases of the Orthodox Culture” thought that 
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studying this subject would bring about rising the level of spirituality and culture 
(35%), appearance of the first moral generation in Russia (6%), and even revival of 
Russia’s former grandeur (5%). 3% of the respondents supposed that political and 
economic position of the ROC would strengthen (it might have been said by both 
adherents and opponents of studying Orthodoxy in schools). 
39% of respondents were very pessimistic about the problem in discussion. 
They foretold the split of the society by the religious feature (17%), persecution of 
dissidents (9%), decadence of science and culture (6%), and as a reaction to the 
compulsory introduction of the religion – splash of atheism among the youth (7%). 
The Communist idea of unity, equality, brotherhood and benevolence is the 
nearest to the expression of the Russian mentality, and the evidences of this are 
unremitting spirit of collectivism, the majority’s interest to collective activity. 
Besides, Russian open nature transforming into internationalism does not 
contradict Christian egalitarian teaching on the eternal “high values” – love, 
brotherhood and equality. Maybe just because of it Protestant organizations had 
such a success at the beginning of the 90s of the last century, spreading quickly all 
around the territory of the former Soviet Union, and still keep their influence 
nowadays. 
The government of the post-soviet Russia has practically copied ideal 
principles of interactions between the state and the religion, realized during the 
Soviet period, having changed the ideology of “militant atheism” with the idea of 
“turning all people into Orthodoxy”. At the level of the highest representative 
power law drafts are discussed which infringe directly or indirectly the legitimate 
rights of not only small confessions, but traditional for Russia religious 
organizations (Catholic and Protestant). From the beginning of the 3
rd 
millennium 
the State Duma constantly discusses projects of appeals to the President of Russia 
on prohibition of the activity of those confessions threatening the integrity of the 
RF and spiritual health of the citizens. On April, 17, 2002 Duma discussed such a 
question “On Appealing of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the RF to 
the President of the Russian Federation V.Putin about the activity of the Roman-
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Catholitic Church at the territory of the RF”.
19
 In 2001 the State Duma considered 
amendments to the active Law on Religion (1997). 300 of them contradicted the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation: introduction of the term “traditional 
religion”, more attention to the traditional for the given region religions, 
regulations of the activity of religious organizations in schools and kindergartens, 
control after the activity of religious groups, requirement of being not less than 3 
local religious organizations to make a centralized religious organization, and from 
10 to 45 (50) founders of a local religious organization. It becomes a tradition for 
the State Duma to invite prominent representatives of the ROC to take part in the 
discussions on the theme “Problems of legislative Support of the Relations 
between the State and the Church in the light of Social Conception of the Russian 
Orthodox Church”.
20
 
The ROC regularly consecrates state buildings, techniques, cars and 
different social events. For example, in Yekaterinburg the Archbishop of 
Yekaterinburg and Verchotur Vikenty in 2001 with the invitation of the authorities 
consecrated buildings of the Ministry of Taxation of Sverdlovsk region. In April, 
2004, Moscow Patriarchate considered a question of the State Duma building’s 
consecration, and the rooms of many orthodox deputies had already been 
consecrated by their requests.
21
 Now the ROC’s representatives wait for a request 
from the leaders of the State Duma. In October, 2005, the consecration of the fire-
brigades of the regional center was conducted.
22
 
In reality today we watch the realization of a new strategic project of a new 
Russian bourgeoisie and its bureaucratic state apparatus which consists of giving 
the Orthodox Church the right to fill, at least partially, “the spiritual vacuum” after 
the falling of the Soviet ideology.  But to take the spiritual education in its hands it 
is necessary to make Orthodoxy a basis of morality, the ideological base of 
education in the country. For this aim the Church collaborated with the scientific 
                                                 
19
 See: РИА «Новости» от 16 апреля 2002 г. 
20
 See: Коммерсантъ от 9 июля 2001 г. 
21
 See: РИА «Новости» от 15 апреля 2004 г. 
22
See: http://www.pobeda.ru/duhovenstvo/kemerovo.html 
 
 19 
world. The result was a letter by the Patriarch Aleksy II, president of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences Y.Osipov, President of the Russian Academy of Education 
N.Nikandrov, head of the Moscow State University V.Sadovnichev, sent to the 
Minister of Education V.Filippov in January, 1999. In that letter scientists, well-
known all over the world, glorified the Church’s services to history and country, 
criticized “Soviet atheism” and atheistic “democratic ideas”, and insisted on 
religious education in secondary and high school. Among the general directions for 
public schools are: including “religion oriented subjects” (basics of Orthodox 
culture, theology) into the list of the obligatory ones; introducing new 
specializations (history of Christian teachings, history and theory of Christian art, 
Orthodox theology, theology of Islam, Buddhism, Judaism). In fact, the Minister 
had got a strict instruction which was brought into the life. 
Thus, today in Russia there is an inevitable process of fusing the state (its 
authorities or some parts of them) and the Church (the Patriarchate or regional 
eparchies), which is reflected both at the state policy in the whole, reducing it to 
monopoly ideological control after dissidents (the analogy after the state structure 
of the soviet Russia),and the functional content of the activity of social institutes 
(political, economic, educational, cultural and religious), as well as spiritual health 
of citizens.  
It is necessary to note that the principles of the freedom of worship, equality 
of religions, and independence from the state can be ensured only when there is a 
democratic state and public system. And constructive and integrative functions of 
the most important social institutes cannot be realized through the submission of 
the Church by the State or absorption of the State by the Church (i.e. when the 
Church acquires de jure or de facto state status as a single and obligatory religion).   
Policy Recommendations   
Russia for many centuries has been a polycultural and polyreligious country, 
and it has met intercultural and intercofessional problems deciding them by law or 
by heart. Today it still remains very important to keep civil peace, to create 
prerequisites of civil initiatives for preventing ethnic and religious intolerance.  
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The Russian Federation inherited a lot of insoluble problems; the state 
authorities did not propose any clear and convincing projects of planned education 
of religious tolerance. This has given birth to many public movements, based on 
the ideas of xenophobia and chauvinism, which begin influence more persistently 
some structures of the state power, co-governing in this way. Such connivance of 
the state power and sometimes even encouragement of the religious fanaticism 
may lead to irretrievable consequences.  
 Russia is in a rather difficult situation concerning the freedom of worship. 
Foreign experts put it in the list of countries with "the discriminating legislation or 
preconceived policy which causes detriment to certain religions, though the 
government's activities are in accordance with the Constitution".
23
 
In this connection, it is necessary to elaborate recommendations for the 
authorities to conduct state social policy not contradicting the Constitutions, 
international rights and freedoms, and for members of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, for "traditional" and "non-traditional" confessions acting in Russia to 
overcome negative results of national and religious intolerance. 
 
For the Executive and Legislative Authorities of the Russian 
Federation: 
1. First of all, it is necessary to prove the unity of the state by curbing the 
religious (orthodox) fundamentalism through the key spheres – religious 
tolerance and social values. 
2. The analysis of the legislation shows a serious disparity between it and 
the real situation at the religious sphere. So, it needs to change the 
existing norms provoking the discrimination between confessions or on 
the basis of their "traditionalism – non-traditionalism". 
3. All around Russia in every social institute (family, educational 
establishment and so on) to declare secular values, based on the 
principles of freedom and equality. It concerns especially the institutes of 
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socializations and interiorisation of the rising generation. We need to stop 
the joining of the state and the church, and the church with school, 
because religious world viewing with its mystique and myths is not 
combined with the scientific knowledge.  
4. The purpose of such education is to acquaint people with religions of 
Russia and neighboring states to help them to realize that all people have 
an equal right to believe in the verity of their religion, and that other 
people, different by their confessions, are actually just the same human 
beings. 
For the Russian Orthodox Church (the ROC): 
1. In Russia the Orthodox fundamentalism is the most dangerous. It takes 
the political forms of archaic and extreme content and can change the 
whole political culture, therefore, the ideology of the state social policy.  
2. As far as the ROC is the most influent power in today's Russian social 
and political situation, it is very important whether it will be able to 
overcome its own ambitions and to put a line between the Church and 
Fundamentalism, not falling into the "political sectarianism".  
3. The ROC must declare in public open attitude of the Church to the 
modern society, free from any chauvinistic reminiscent.  
For all other confessions acting in Russia: 
1. As long as many confessions have rather wide judicial practice (due to 
often trials) including international experience (by foreign missioners) it 
is necessary to participate in development of the legislative initiatives, 
directed to bringing the Russian legislation to the highest European and 
world standards in the sphere of freedom of worship, and to monitor 
regularly law drafts and international pacts of Russia. 
 
See Appendix. 
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